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From Honor to Dignity: 
Criminal Libel, Press Freedom, and Racist Speech in Brazil and the United States 
 
Jan Hoffman French 
University of Richmond 
 
 Reports on violence against journalists in Brazil have captured media attention and the concern 
of international organizations such as the Committee to Protect Journalists and Reporters Without 
Borders.1 Short of violence, other concerns about press freedom have surfaced, such as the successful 
assertion by public figures of their right to keep unauthorized biographies out of print. The case 
presented in this article involves another such concern: the use of criminal defamation laws to punish 
journalists for criticizing public officials.2 At the same time, Brazilian media sources regularly report 
on crimes of racism, which most often involve derogatory name-calling and hate speech. By examining 
the intersection of these apparently contradictory concerns, this article sheds new light on speech 
rights in Brazil and the United States and argues that a comparative perspective is crucial to 
contextualizing and harmonizing free speech and its limitations under modern democratic 
constitutions.  
 
The Case and the Law 
 
When I first learned that a Brazilian blogger and journalist, José Cristian Góes, from the small 
northeastern state of Sergipe, had been prosecuted and found guilty of criminal libel, it seemed like an 
open and shut case of government repression and a clear human rights violation. International press 
freedom organizations had picked up on the case and Góes, who is not a nationally-known figure, was 
flown by Article 19, an international nongovernmental organization,3to testify at a public hearing of 
the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights of the Organization of American States in October 
2013.4 His case was presented as indicative of a lack of press freedom in Brazil and posited as a human 
rights violation. As I investigated the circumstances of the case and looked into its legal underpinnings, 
it became clear that my perspective as a United States lawyer and anthropologist had led me to assume 
that freedom of speech from a constitutional perspective is an uncomplicated, universal principle and 
that my assumptions needed to be revised. I discovered that a single case that could have been scripted 
for the Theater of the Absurd might shed light on larger issues associated with free speech in Brazil, 
the United States, and other democratic countries. As noted by comparative law scholar, Ronald 
Krotoszynski, “[u]nlike some rights, free speech simply is not the subject of broad transnational 
consensus as to either its shape or scope” (222). 
 Without delving too much into its deeper political history and meaning, the blogger’s case can 
be outlined as follows: In 2009, Edson Ulisses de Melo, a lawyer who had been involved in a variety 
of human rights initiatives in the capital city of Aracaju and a respected member of the local bar 
association, was named by his brother-in-law, Marcelo Déda, governor of Sergipe and a strong 
supporter of the national Workers Party (the ruling party of Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, president from 
2003 to 2010, and Dilma Rousseff, president from 2011 to 2018), to sit as a judge on the highest court 
of the state of Sergipe.5 When the appointment was announced, José Cristian Góes posted a series of 
blog entries complaining of possible nepotism.6 Although not mentioned in the blog, Déda was 
diagnosed with pancreatic and stomach cancer in 2009 and died at the age of 53 in December 2013. 
In May 2012, when Governor Déda was taking his final round of chemotherapy, Góes posted a 
“fictional” story told in the first person from the ostensible perspective of the governor, although he 
was not named.7 The published story portrayed the narrator as an old-fashioned coronel, a despotic, 
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oligarchical figure (common in Brazilian history and folklore) who controlled large estates and the 
peasants who worked on them.8 This was a metaphor for Déda’s control of the state with specific 
reference to alleged misuse of state funds. Góes wrote, presumably in the voice of Déda, “I am the 
one with the money, despite the view that the money is public. I am the big boss. I am the one who 
hires and fires. I am the one who contracts ass-kissers, gunmen, and jesters…” Obliquely, but 
recognizably, referring to a statewide teachers’ strike earlier that year and a building occupation by an 
urban social movement, against which Judge Edson Ulisses had issued injunctions, the story 
continued, still in Déda’s presumed voice, “It is said that strikes are part of democracy and I have to 
accept that. I accept nothing. I hired a personal gunman of the laws (jagunço das leis), who is, not by 
coincidence, the husband of my sister, and gave these people a kick in the butt”. Judge Edson Ulisses 
brought a criminal complaint for defamation, charging that Góes had impugned his reputation and 
offended his dignity. 
 In Brazil, defamation, in addition to being a civil claim, can carry criminal penalties. Under the 
current Brazilian Penal Code there are three privately-initiated criminal actions referred to as “crimes 
against honor”, in descending order of punitive harshness: calumny or falsely accusing someone of a 
crime (six months to two years and a fine); defamation (three months to a year and a fine); and injúria 
(which may be translated as offensive insult) (three months to a year and a fine). The prohibition 
against injúria was amended in 1997 to increase penalties if the offensive language makes reference to 
race, color, ethnicity, religion, or origin (referred to as injúria qualificada) and in certain cases, penalties 
may be increased if the offended party is a public official (and the offense goes to the function of the 
position), elderly or disabled.9 In the case at hand, the blogger José Cristian Góes was prosecuted, at 
the judge’s initiative, under the injúria section of the law, found guilty, and the decision was affirmed 
on appeal.10 Góes was not fined, but was sentenced to perform community service (in lieu of a seven-
month term of house detention), although in subsequent blog postings and other reports about the 
case, Góes stated that he was “condemned to prison”. Albeit inaccurate, international organizations 
picked up and used this language in their reports to enhance their assertion that press freedom is under 
attack in Brazil. 
 Góes asserted in his defense that the column was a work of fiction, even though to anyone 
familiar with state and local politics there could have been no doubt as to whom it was referring. In 
court papers and blog posts after the original July 4, 2013 trial court decision and before the appellate 
court upheld it three months later, Góes hung his argument entirely on the assertion that it was only 
“possible” to identify Governor Déda and Judge Edson Ulisses since the story had been written in 
the first person. Based on the language of the law and jurisprudential interpretations, as well as 
testimonial evidence, both courts ruled that no one could mistake the identities of the characters in 
the story and that the judge’s honor had been offended, his reputation besmirched, and his dignity 
damaged. The trial court found that “journalists have the right to opine against and criticize, even in 
severe, ironic, and merciless ways, any person or authority, but this right is limited by the fundamental 
right to intimidade [intimacy, selfhood, privacy] of the person who is the target of the criticisms.” 
Looking to the penal code provisions, the finding that the judge had suffered injúria was all but 
impossible to avoid. It was clear that the blog post referred to the judge and that his reputation in 
relation to his public functions had been impugned. This was all the statute required and the state 
courts deciding the case were not in a position to declare the federal statute unconstitutional even if 
they had wanted to do so.11 
 The enhanced protection of public officials from defamation has a long history in Brazil, while 
in the United States public criticism of government officials or candidates for office that are potentially 
defamatory in nature has, since the 1960s, often been seen as an important component of an open 
political process. Therefore, to those most accustomed to the United States policy of enhanced 
protection for those defaming public officials, the Brazilian system that considers it worse to insult a 
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public official than an ordinary person seems anti-democratic or overly protective of those in power. 
On the other hand, some argue that those willing to perform public service at their own personal risk 
should receive protection from personal attacks. However, if the anti-racist speech provision of the 
anti-defamation law in Brazil were to be invoked in such a case, a public official who is the object of 
racist remarks should perhaps be permitted even further enhanced protection. This matter has not 
been discussed in the Brazilian literature, nor has it yet been considered in the United States. 
Despite, or perhaps because of its absurdity, the Góes case was used in campaigns by 
international organizations, such as Reporters Without Borders, Article 19, Committee to Protect 
Journalists, and International Freedom of Expression Exchange (the Canadian-based free expression 
network currently known as IFEX), to illustrate a lack of press freedom in Brazil. Their stories about 
the case invariably glossed its details as “exposing corruption”—an overstatement that concealed more 
than it revealed. As is the case in Brazil (and elsewhere, other than the United States), the word 
“corruption” is often used to increase political stakes at the local or national level and to attract 
international attention. Allegations of corruption are mostly reserved for developing countries and 
most recently particularly for the BRICS countries (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa) that 
pose economic challenges on the world scene. This is not to deny the existence of corruption and 
illegal financial practices in those countries, but to point out that the media, governments, and 
international nongovernmental organizations often deploy the discourse of corruption strategically. 
The Góes case, rather than being about corruption, was more accurately about personal 
animosity and political differences that erupted into a public argument in which a traditional notion 
of “honor” was invoked. As explained in the courts’ decisions, evidence of the judge’s loss of dignity 
was crucial to the outcome of the case because loss of honor and dignity are fundamental elements of 
the statutory crime of injúria for which the blogger Goés was prosecuted. Although difficult to 
understand for those of us in the United States who take for granted an expansive interpretation of 
free speech as embodied in the First Amendment, this odd case can serve as a point of entry to 
investigate its placement within the firmament of Brazilian legal tradition and constitutional law. 
Moreover, the case can provide an unusual opening for a consideration of how honor, dignity, and 
free speech may be related.  
 
Honor, Dignity, and Racist Speech 
 
Honor has received more attention than dignity in historical work on Brazilian life and law.12 
Protection of honor was most often invoked to preserve the position and status of a person in power, 
supporting and reinforcing a fundamentally unequal social system. Based on a colonial system 
concerned above all else with honor and status, the advent of the Brazilian Republic in 1889 and the 
first postcolonial Penal Code, enacted a year later, reveal “more continuity than change from colonial 
to modern times” (Uribe-Uran 458). The Penal Code of 1890, although “a far cry from the colonial 
Philippine Code”, was “permeated by rigidly hierarchical, status-based conceptions of public honor 
and draconian punishments for its infringement. Yet it still enshrined a broadly defined concept of 
honor as a fundamental individual right and attribute” (Fischer 181). In fact, the current law governing 
injúria under which Góes was prosecuted is not very different from the law as it stood in 1890, although 
the prescribed punishments are very much reduced. Always considered a “private crime,” prosecution 
can only be initiated by the injured party, as it was by Judge Edson Ulisses. 
Dignity, while sometimes included as a discursive sibling of honor, has a related yet distinct 
trajectory. Honor was seen as protecting an individual’s reputation or face to the world, while dignity 
carried a more internal sense, protecting an individual’s self-worth (Fischer 182).13 As noted above, 
this aspect of the Góes case alleging injúria was an important deciding factor in ruling in favor of Judge 
Edson Ulisses. The court reproduced the judge’s testimony in full supporting the damage he had 
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suffered in which he detailed how the words of the blog post attacked the “core of his personhood,” 
especially since he had always been an important defender of human rights. While subjective and 
difficult to measure, the importance of dignity and what it has come to mean in recent years holds the 
key to assessing the variety of perspectives on free speech in liberal democracies. 
With the development of a democratic aspiration and ethos in Brazil, earlier aristocratic 
notions of honor have increasingly become associated with a broader distribution of dignity 
throughout society. What legal history described as a protection of the hierarchical status quo in the 
form of crimes against honor became, in the late twentieth century, associated with the protection of 
individual dignity as a right for all citizens —an equalizing measure designed to enhance the rights of 
those who had never before been entitled to traditional notions of honor. And with a legal 
commitment to equality comes the drive to protect that equality. Shortly after the end of the Brazilian 
military regime (1964-1985), a Constituent Assembly was formed in 1987 with more than 550 elected 
delegates who worked for over a year in committees, holding hearings, and receiving letters, petitions, 
and testimony from across society. The result of those deliberations was the democratic Constitution 
of 1988, which begins with an affirmation of the foundational importance of dignity. Brazil, it 
proclaims, is a “democratic state founded on the dignity of the human person” (Article 1, III). 
This emphasis on dignity has been interpreted by legal scholars as infusing the traditional 
notion of honor with a duty of equal treatment and respect for all individuals in their personal and 
professional lives, with special attention to self-esteem and individual autonomy. Often associated 
with a Kantian perspective on dignity, this provision was modeled on the German constitution of 
1949 (Martins; Sarlet).14 It is the first hint that the Brazilian constitutional limitation on freedom of 
expression is tied to the post-World War II European impetus to protect individual members of 
vilified minorities against the effects of institutionalized hatred (with postwar Germany as the clearest 
example). Evidence of this transition from honor to dignity is best illustrated in the watershed Brazilian 
case of Siegfried Ellwanger, who in 2003 was condemned by a state court for the crime of racism for 
publishing books that spread prejudice against Jews.  This was the first hate speech case to come 
before the Brazilian Supreme Court, which upheld Ellwanger’s conviction by a seven to three vote. 
The majority opinions considered this case as an opportunity to address the perceived conflict between 
free speech, on the one hand, and equality and anti-discrimination, on the other.  
This is unlike the United States, whose unqualified constitutional protection of free speech is 
unusual on the world scene. The first amendment to the United States Constitution states, “Congress 
shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or 
abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to 
petition the Government for a redress of grievances” (emphasis added). On its face, no balancing is 
required—freedom of speech is supreme and unfettered. Brazil’s free speech provision, on the other 
hand, is not facially unlimited, and thus requires direct balancing of two fundamental rights—personal 
dignity and freedom of expression (Ardenghi; Farias). The Ellwanger case provided the opportunity 
for the Brazilian Supreme Court to address this balance directly. 
Because “constitutional text matters” (Krotoszynksi 215), the language of the Brazilian 
Constitution itself is an important place to start. Article 5, with its 78 sections, sets forth the terms 
under which all residents of Brazil are guaranteed “the right to life, liberty, equality, security, and 
property”. Those terms include: the “free expression of thought, so long as not expressed 
anonymously” (Section 4); “free expression of intellectual, artistic, scientific activity, and of 
communication” (Section 9); the “inviolability of intimacy, private life, honor, and image” (Section 
10); and Article 220, which expands on freedom of the press, reaffirming the limitation that Section 
10 (privacy) places on that freedom. Brazilian constitutional limitations on free speech, grounded in 
human dignity, reflect international law as well as the laws of almost all Western democracies, except 
for the United States. Article 19, the international nongovernmental organization that paid for Góes 
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to testify at the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, mentioned in the opening of this 
article, is named for the free speech provision of the 1976 International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights (of which Brazil is a signatory). Ironically, however, unlike the First Amendment to the United 
States Constitution, and more like the Brazilian 1988 Constitution, Article 19 of the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights is explicitly limited by “respect for the reputation of others”. 
Long before the Brazilian Constitution was adopted in 1988 in an atmosphere of incipient 
democratic debate, an anti-press freedom law, known as the Press Law of 1967 (Law No. 5250/67), 
was decreed in preparation for the darkest days of the military regime, which began with the 
declaration of Institutional Act 5 (AI-5) in December 1968. That draconian anti-press law, with broad 
terms and long, mandatory prison sentences added to those of the standard anti-defamation provisions 
of the Penal Code, placed specific restraints on journalists “by banning information that [was] contrary 
to good customs, decency, family values, and even national symbols” (Lanao 351). Although used 
much less often after the 1988 Constitution came into effect, the Press Law of 1967 remained on the 
books for twenty years—well into the consolidation of democracy in Brazil.15 It was finally declared 
unconstitutional by the Brazilian Supreme Court in 2009 with a 7 to 4 vote.16 The powerful language 
of the majority opinion did not find it necessary to address, let alone overturn, the sections of the 
Brazilian Penal Code that continues to levy criminal sanctions on various forms of defamation, 
including injúria (under which Góes was prosecuted) and injúria qualificada (against hate speech—more 
about this below), which had been added in 1997.17 Interestingly, the majority opinion of the Supreme 
Court overturning the Press Law of 1967 was reprinted in its entirety in the decision condemning the 
journalist Góes. The court pointed out that Góes was not being prosecuted under the Press Law of 
1967, but rather under the criminal libel law (injúria in this case) that remains in effect.  
It is my contention that the criminal libel law under which Góes was prosecuted (and had been 
in place in some form for over a century) was left in place and has not been declared unconstitutional 
precisely because it has come to be seen as protecting human dignity. The key to this argument is that 
a provision for injúria qualificada was added in 1997, which provides an enhanced legal remedy for 
individuals who are subjected to racist hate speech. Returning to the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights, the provision immediately following the eponymous Article 19 prohibits 
“advocacy of national, racial or religious hatred that constitutes incitement to discrimination, hostility 
or violence”. This language of Article 20 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
is equivalent to Article 5, Section 42 of Brazil’s 1988 Constitution, which makes racism, including 
racist speech, an unbailable offense. Some assert that the addition of injúria qualificada created an end-
run around the constitutional anti-racism provision by allowing bail for racism, with the result that 
individuals who hurl racial insults do not go to jail, seen as a serious problem. At the same time, there 
is a clear increase in complaints. According to Raíssa Lopes, in the state of Minas Gerais (where there 
is no police office dedicated to taking racist criminal complaints, as there are in São Paulo and Rio de 
Janeiro), in 2013 there were 167 complaints of crimes resulting from racism, while in just the first four 
months of 2014 there were already 66 complaints.  In Brasília, the number of complaints rose 40% 
from 2012 to 2013 (310 to 434). All of these provisions, together with increased public awareness of 
them, are evidence of the international consensus that hate speech should be prohibited. They go hand 
in hand with the limitations that a commitment to human dignity, in the form of protection of the 
intimate self, place on unfettered freedom of expression in the overwhelming majority of democratic 
countries in the world today—again, except for the United States.18 
 
Balancing Freedom and Equality 
 
In countries such as Brazil and in many parts of Europe where a “culture of honor” was 
historically predominant, the expectation of respect that goes hand in hand with notions of honor has, 
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since the late twentieth century, begun to be democratized (Whitman 1328). These systems can be 
seen as “hav[ing] human ‘dignity’ today largely because they had personal ‘honor’ in the past” 
(Whitman 1385). Moreover, dignity has become integral to the post-World War II human rights 
regime (Beitz), which since the late 1970s has become, for many, critical to humanitarian hope for the 
future (Moyn). Dignity has also become the justification for limiting free speech (Carmi) and 
“expresses the idea of the high and equal rank of every human person” (Waldron and Dan-Cohen 14). 
In other words, Brazil can be seen as using the modern concept of dignity, as it has been incorporated 
into human rights discourse, to tip the balance of free speech versus equality in favor of the latter. By 
infusing the language of “honor” with the discourse of “dignity”, countries such as Brazil (in line with 
the postwar European trend) are taking a stand on group libel, a term often preferred by countries 
that outlaw it (Waldron 40) and a term that comports with the language of Article 20 of the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (“any advocacy of national, racial or religious 
hatred”). As such, they are choosing to prevent attacks on the dignity of members of society, to avoid 
a “polluted social environment”, and to “protect an atmosphere of mutual respect” (Waldron 35, 30) 
at the expense of absolute free speech. 
This can be seen most clearly in relation to the criminalization of racism. Brazil’s governments, 
since the postwar democratic period, have consistently criminalized racism, and particularly racist 
speech. The 1988 Constitution makes racism an unbailable offense and a number of laws since then, 
including the injúria qualificada addition to the Penal Code in 1997 have been enacted to operationalize 
that constitutional provision by increasing penalties for defamation if it involves racist speech.19  With 
the exception of a handful of law journal articles, there has been very little public discussion in Brazil 
of what in the United States is seen as an almost intractable contradiction between regulating hate 
speech and the First Amendment, which since the mid-twentieth century has been the symbol of an 
unfettered right to free speech.  
The United States perspective is often referred to as speech absolutism, authoritarianism, or 
fundamentalism (Gilreath; Waldron). In the view of legal scholar and gay rights activist Shannon 
Gilreath, the expanding breadth of the First Amendment to include anything short of “fighting words” 
in relation to personal invective (and not restricted to political speech) leaves little room for 
considering the effects of words on equality rights (122). In his view “it is entirely consistent with the 
commitment to free speech to draw a distinction between speech that has as its aim genuine political 
debate […] and speech that has as its aim the silence and demoralization of others” (Gilreath 213). 
Gilreath places hope in a case in which the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals approved a high school’s 
decision to forbid a student’s homophobic t-shirt on the grounds that it condemned and denigrated 
other students on the basis of their sexual orientation (117). In an unusual move for United States 
federal jurisprudence, rather than looking at possible disruption as a justification (the test of “clear 
and present danger”), the court examined the right to be free from “assaultive speech” short of 
fighting words. 20  From the perspective of Gilreath and others who would like to see greater 
consideration given to the power of language as a force equivalent to other forms of illegal 
discrimination, this case may be the beginning of a shift in perspective—a shift that could lead the 
United States in the direction of Brazil and Western Europe in relation to hate speech regulation.21 
Scholars and members of the general public in the United States are rethinking the 
“marketplace of ideas” argument for absolute free speech. In the words of media historian John 
Durham Peters, expressing his critique of that doctrine, the “credo that anything is permitted because 
everything in the end advances the public good looks dubious, and the theodicy that pain always bears 
fruit seems indecent” (287). In 1990, legal scholar Charles Lawrence published a bracing argument in 
the Duke Law Journal in favor of campus speech codes, which although declared unconstitutional in 
the 1990s recently captured the imagination of my large class of undergraduates, many of whom suffer 
racist slights on a regular basis. The recent revelations about sexual assault on college campuses, and 
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the accompanying increased enforcement of Title IX by the Justice Department, raises the possibility 
of a return to some form of in loco parentis on campuses. That doctrine was in effect until the early 
1970s when, as a result of campus unrest and demands, the Family Educational Right to Privacy Act 
of 1974 (FERPA) was enacted.  That law, still in force, provides college students who are over the age 
of eighteen with rights of privacy that keep their educational records confidential and out of the reach 
of their parents and other family members. Now that there is a call for greater attention to the safety 
of college students, the question whether there might be a return to greater university-level 
administrative protection of students is being discussed. If so, it would be interesting to consider how 
speech codes (forbidding racist and other forms of hate speech on campus), which were overturned 
by federal courts twenty-five years ago, might fare in the current climate of greater demands for 
oversight of the emotional and psychological well-being of college students.  
Since those campus speech codes were overturned, there has emerged a cadre of US scholars 
who are dedicated to considering the pain that language can inflict and to finding legal means of 
addressing that pain.22 As a result, regulating hate speech is beginning to look a bit less blasphemous 
in the theoretical universe of First Amendment scholarship than it was for most of the twentieth 
century.23 Even some of those who believe that freedom in the United States depends on protecting 
“the thought that we hate”, such as Anthony Lewis (157-167), have been moving toward rethinking 
protection of historically demeaned minorities from hateful public speech. Debate in the United 
States, which seemed to be settled not that long ago, has found renewed life with the Internet, bullying, 
and, most recently, nongovernmental consequences exacted for racist speech. In that regard, it is 
important to note that approximately fifteen states in the United States have criminal libel laws on the 




This article has traced an unusual conceptual road from a seemingly odd case of criminal 
defamation involving a blogger and a judge in the smallest state of Brazil to the grand question of hate 
speech regulation in Western democracies. By considering the infusion of traditional notions of honor 
and status with post-World War II views of dignity, it is possible to see that a case whose result can 
be the subject of international press freedom campaigns can also be used to drive a comparative 
consideration of how best to combat racism and whether hate speech regulation should be part of 
that struggle. As such, the type of law often used to protect the powerful in Brazil could come to be 
used to protect the vulnerable in the United States. When, as Brazilian constitutional scholar Daniel 
Sarmento (238) notes, “hate speech is destined exclusively to negate the fundamental principal of 
equality between people, propagating inferiority of some and legitimating discrimination”, the irony 




Ardenghi, Régis Schneider. “Direito À Vida Privada E Direito À Informação: Colisão De Direitos 
Fundamentais.” Revista da ESMESC (Escola Superior da Magistratura do Estado de Santa Catarina) 
19.25 (2012).  
Atencio, Rebecca J. Memory's Turn: Reckoning with Dictatorship in Brazil. Madison: U of Wisconsin P, 
2014. Print. 
Barahona, Renato. Sex Crimes, Honour, and the Law in Early Modern Spain: Vizcaya, 1528-1735. Toronto: U of 
Toronto P, 2003. Print. 
Beattie, Peter M. The Tribute of Blood: Army, Honor, Race, and Nation in Brazil, 1864-1945. Durham: Duke 
UP, 2001. Print. 
Vanderbilt e-Journal of Luso-Hispanic Studies 
 
9 
Beitz, Charles R. “Human Dignity in the Theory of Human Rights: Nothing but a Phrase?” Philosophy 
& Public Affairs 41.3 (2013): 259-90. Print. 
Butler, Judith. Excitable Speech: A Politics of the Performative. New York: Routledge, 1997. Print. 
Carmi, Guy E. “Dignity—the Enemy from Within: A Theoretical and Comparative Analysis of 
Human Dignity as a Free Speech Justification.” University of Pennsylvania Journal of Constitutional 
Law 9 (2007): 957-1001. Print. 
---. “Dignity Versus Liberty: The Two Western Cultures of Free Speech.” Boston University International 
Law Journal 26 (2008): 277-374. Print. 
Castro, Américo. De la edad conflictiva. 2nd ed. Madrid: Taurus, 1961. Print. 
Caulfield, Sueann, Sarah C. Chambers, and Lara Putnam, eds. Honor, Status, and Law in Modern Latin 
America. Durham: Duke UP, 2005. Print. 
Faoro, Raimundo. Os Donos do Poder: Formação do Patronato Político Brasileiro. 9th ed. São Paulo: Ed. Globo, 1993. 
Print. 
Farias, Edílson Pereira de Farias. Colisão De Direitos: A Honra, a Intimidade, a Vida Privada E a Imagem 
Versus a Liberdade De Expressão E Informação. 2nd ed. Porto Alegre: Fabris, 2000. Print. 
Feres Júnior, João, Miguel Lorena, and Eduardo Barbabela. “Political Protest in Brazil: The Role of 
the News Media.” Latin American Studies Association Congress. Washington, DC. May 2014. Print. 
Fischer, Brodwyn M. “Slandering Citizens: Insults, Class, and Social Legitimacy in Rio De Janeiro's 
Criminal Courts.” Honor, Status, and Law in Modern Latin America. Eds. Caulfield, Sueann, Sarah 
C. Chambers, and Lara Putnam. Durham: Duke UP, 2005. 176-200. Print. 
Fiss, Owen M. The Irony of Free Speech. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard UP, 1996. Print. 
Gilreath, Shannon. The End of Straight Supremacy: Realizing Gay Liberation. Cambridge, New York: 
Cambridge UP, 2012. Print. 
Hernandez, Tanya K. “Hate Speech and the Language of Racism in Latin America: A Lens for 
Reconsidering Global Hate Speech Restrictions and Legislation Models.” University of 
Pennsylvania Journal of International Law 32 (2011): 805-41. Print. 
Krotoszynski, Ronald J. The First Amendment in Cross-Cultural Perspective: A Comparative Legal Analysis of 
the Freedom of Speech. New York: New York UP, 2006. Print. 
Lanao, Jairo E. “Symposium on the Role of a Free Press and Freedom of Expression in the 
Development and Consolidation of Democracies in Latin America: Legal Challenges to 
Freedom of the Press in the Americas.” University of Miami Law Review 56 (2002): 347-76. Print. 
Larson, Donald R. The Honor Plays of Lope De Vega. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard UP, 1977. Print. 
Lawrence III, Charles R. “If He Hollers Let Him Go: Regulating Racist Speech on Campus.” Duke 
Law Journal 3 (1990): 431-83. Print. 
Lehnen, Leila Maria. Citizenship and Crisis in Contemporary Brazilian Literature. New York: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2013. Print. 
Lewis, Anthony. Freedom for the Thought That We Hate: A Biography of the First Amendment. New York: 
Basic Books, 2007. Print. 
Lisby, Gregory C. “No Place in the Law: The Ignominy of Criminal Libel in American Jurisprudence.” 
Communication Law and Policy 9 (2004): 433-87. Print. 
Lopes, Raíssa. “Racistas Não Vão Para a Cadeia.” Brasil de Fato: Uma Visão Popular do Brasil e do Mundo. 
Web. June 6, 2014. http://www.brasildefato.com.br/node/28809. 
Martins, Flademir Jerônimo Belinati. Dignidade Da Pessoa Humana: Princípio Constituiconal Fundamental. 
Curitiba: Editora Juruá, 2003. Print. 
Moyn, Samuel. The Last Utopia: Human Rights in History. Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press of Harvard 
UP, 2010. Print. 
Pasqualucci, Jo M. “Criminal Defamation and the Evolution of the Doctrine of Freedom of 
Expression in International Law: Comparative Jurisprudence of the Inter-American Court of 
Vanderbilt e-Journal of Luso-Hispanic Studies 
 
10 
Human Rights.” Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law 39 (2006): 379-433. Print. 
Peters, John Durham. Courting the Abyss: Free Speech and the Liberal Tradition. Chicago: U of Chicago P, 
2005. Print. 
Pritchard, David. “Rethinking Criminal Libel: An Empirical Study.” Communication Law and Policy 14 
(2009): 303-39. Print. 
Rebhun, Linda-Anne. The Heart Is Unknown Country: Love in the Changing Economy of Northeast Brazil. 
Stanford: Stanford UP, 1999. Print. 
Rosenfeld, Michel. “Hate Speech in Constitutional Jurisprudence: A Comparative Analysis.” Cardozo 
Law Review 24.4 (2003): 1523-67. Print. 
Santos, Martha S. Cleansing Honor with Blood: Masculinity, Violence, and Power in the Backlands of Northeast 
Brazil, 1845-1889. Stanford: Stanford UP, 2012. Print. 
Sarlet, Ingo Wolfgang. Dignidade da Pessoa Humana e Direitos Fundamentais na Constituição Federal de 1988. 
9th ed. Porto Alegre: Livraria do Advogado Editora, 2012. Print. 
Schauer, Frederick. “The Boundaries of the First Amendment: A Preliminary Exploration of 
Constitutional Salience.” Harvard Law Review 117 (2004): 1765-809. Print. 
---. “Harm(s) and the First Amendment.” Supreme Court Review 2011.1 (2011): 81-111. Print. 
Silveira, Fabiano Augusto Martins. Da Criminalização do Racismo: Aspectos Jurídicos e Sociocriminológicos. 
Belo Horizonte: Del Rey, 2007. Print. 
Uribe-Uran, Victor M. “Book Review: Honor, Status, and Law in Modern Latin America.” The 
Americas 64.3 (2008): 457-58. Print. 
Waldron, Jeremy. The Harm in Hate Speech. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard UP, 2012. Print. 
Waldron, Jeremy, and Meir Dan-Cohen. Dignity, Rank, and Rights. New York: Oxford UP, 2012. Print. 






1 Violence against journalists in Brazil today and since democratization in the mid 1980s is not state repression 
or state sponsored. Rather, private parties, often through hired gunmen, sometimes perpetrate such violence 
to keep corporate or individual wrongdoing from the public eye or to aid in a political campaign. For coverage 
emanating from the United States of violence against Brazilian journalists, see Journalism in the Americas, a blog 
sponsored by the Knight Center of the University of Texas at Austin 
(https://knightcenter.utexas.edu/blog/00-14077-freedom-expression-unfulfilled-promise-brazil); Council on 
Hemispheric Affairs (http://www.coha.org/press-freedom-in-brazil-sound-the-alarm/); and Freedom House 
(http://www.freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-press/2013/brazil#.U9P3MFbBCRI). 
2 Although it is not addressed in this article, one could argue that publicity regarding violations of press freedom 
is, in part, politically motivated, i.e. by political forces opposed to the current government. The political 
positioning of the Brazilian media has been noted by some Brazilian social scientists after the coverage of the 
pre-World Cup protests in 2013. See Feres, Miguel, and Barbabela for an empirical analysis of news reports on 
the protests in mainstream Brazilian media sources. 
3 The international nongovernmental organization Article 19 (http://www.article19.org), founded in 1987, 
opened its doors in Brazil in 2008.  Its concern with freedom of expression is focused on the world outside of 
the United States (http://www.article19.org/pages/en/where-we-work.html) and is named for Article 19 of 
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted in 1966 and entered into force in 1976, which 
provides that: (1) Everyone shall have the right to hold opinions without interference; (2) Everyone shall have 
the right to freedom of expression; this right shall include freedom to seek, receive and impart information and 
ideas of all kinds, regardless of frontiers, either orally, in writing or in print, in the form of art, or through any 
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other media of his choice; (3) The exercise of the rights provided for in paragraph 2 of this article carries with 
it special duties and responsibilities. It may therefore be subject to certain restrictions, but these shall only be 
such as are provided by law and are necessary: (a) For respect of the rights or reputations of others; (b) For the 
protection of national security or of public order, or of public health or morals. 
4 For a video recording of the October, 29, 2013 hearing at the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, 
see https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CtTlkaIeZKI. 
5 Appointments of judges are conducted through the state bar association, which puts forward three names.  
The governor then chooses from that list. 
6 In 2011, an investigation of Governor Marcelo Déda was initiated by the federal attorney’s office (for which 
Góes worked at the time) on similar grounds, but did not result in prosecution. 
7 The full text of the blog post, “Eu, o coronel em mim”, dated May 29, 2012, can be found at the following 
site: http://www.infonet.com.br/josecristiangoes/ler.asp?id=128810. All quotations from the blog post and 
the judicial opinions in the text are my translations. 
8 For a famous treatment in film of coronelismo, see the 1978 film directed by Geraldo Sarno, Coronel Delmiro 
Gouviea. For a historical and socio-political analysis of the subject, see Faoro. 
9 See Brazilian Penal Code, Articles 138, 139, 140, and 141. This is a different model than that developed by 
the United States Supreme Court. In the case at hand, the judge was both a public official and elderly, thus 
increasing the penalty. In 1964, the United States Supreme Court held in New York Times vs. Sullivan that a public 
figure, including a public official, carries a greater burden of proof to obtain damages in a civil defamation 
action. 
10 Edson Ulisses de Melo v. José Cristian Góes, Penal Pública Condionada, Juizado Especial Criminal da 
Comarca de Aracaju, Sergipe, Sentença, July 4, 2013 (Processo No. 201245102580); Recurso de Apelação, 
Acordão No. 5450/2013, October 22, 2013 (Processo No. 201301008618). A three-judge panel heard the 
appeal. The vote was two to one with the dissenter arguing that the criminal defamation law should not be 
enforced as a violation of freedom of the press. On August 15, 2014, the Brazilian Supreme Court denied 
Góes’s further appeal and let the appellate court’s decision stand and remain in effect. 
11 See Pasqualucci for a comparison of positions on free speech (limitations versus absolute right) by the Inter-
American Commission on Human Rights, the European Court of Human Rights, and the United Nations 
Human Rights Committee. 
12 For examples of historical treatment of honor in Brazilian life, see Beattie; Caulfield; Fischer; Rebhun; Santos.   
13 The much discussed difference between honor and honra in early modern peninsular Spain is most often 
associated with Américo Castro’s explanation that “El idioma distinguía entre la noción ideal e objetiva del 
‘honor’, y el funcionamiento de esa misma noción, vitalmente realizada en un proceso de vida. El honor es, pero 
la honra pertenece a alguien, actúa y se está moviendo en una vida” (69). For Castro, “la palabra honra parece 
más adherida al alma de quien siente derruido o mermado lo que antes existía con plenitud e seguridad” (70). 
Donald Larson (7), cited in Barahona (233), summarizes that difference as “in sixteenth and seventeenth-
century Spain honor was derived both from who one was as from what one was”. In this conceptualization of a 
distinction made by literary scholars, perhaps one can see the germ of a connection between modern notions 
of the difference between honor and dignity. 
14 Article 1(1) of the German Constitution provides, “Human dignity shall be inviolable. To respect and protect 
it shall be the duty of all state authority”. 
15 For the roles, both potential and real, that literary and musical production played in contributing to the 
dismantling of the hegemony of the Press Law of 1967, see Atencio; Lehnen; and the music of Chico Buarque 
and Geraldo Vandré, among others. 
16 Supreme Court Justice Carlos Ayres Britto, who wrote the primary decision declaring the Press Law of 1967 
unconstitutional, was the uncle of the named partner in the law firm that represented Góes in the Aracaju court 
and lost the appeal. Britto has been consistent in his position on absolute freedom of expression, including his 
dissenting opinion in the Ellwanger case. 
17  The international organization Committee to Protect Journalists, on May 7, 2009, published an article 
declaring victory when the Press Law of 1967 was overturned. It is interesting to note that, although the 
Committee to Protect Journalists called for the overturning of the existing criminal libel law, it made no mention 
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of the anti-racist speech provision added in 1997. See http://www.cpj.org/2009/05/in-victory-for-press-
brazils-high-court-strikes-do.php. 
18 See the Joint Declaration on Universality and the Right to Freedom of Expression issued on May 6, 2014 by 
the United Nations Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Opinion and Expression, the Organization for Security 
and Co-operation in Europe Representative on Freedom of the Media, the Organization of American States 
Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Expression and the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights 
Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Expression and Access to Information, available at  
http://www.oas.org/en/iachr/expression/showarticle.asp?artID=945&lID=1.   
19 See Silveira 64-71. 
20 The case in question is Harper v. Poway Unified School District, Ninth Circuit 2006. According to Gilreath, this 
is the first time that the first prong of the Tinker test on students’ rights in public schools had been invoked. 
21 On the other side, as an example of the Supreme Court’s expanding view of free speech absolutism, is the 
case RAV vs. City of St. Paul (1992), in which the majority ruled that cross burning in front of the house of a 
black family is protected speech and not the equivalent of fighting words.  For a critique of this case, see Butler. 
22 See Fiss; Hernandez; Rosenfeld; Schauer; Waldron. 
23 In all the recent literature questioning the almost sacred assertion of absolute freedom of speech, there has 
been discussion of a Supreme Court decision, Beauharnais v. Illinois (1952), in which group libel was made an 
exception to the absolute right to free speech.  Although Beauharnais has never been explicitly overturned, 
most courts conclude that it was eviscerated by later Supreme Court cases, particularly New York Times v. Sullivan 
(1964), and that it has no lasting effect.  However, given its citation in so much of the recent literature rethinking 
hate speech, a resurrection may be in the offing. 
24 See Lisby and http://www.firstamendmentcenter.org/criminal-libel-statutes-state-by-state.  For example, in 
the state of North Carolina, which still has a criminal statute for libel applicable to the press, a senate bill 
prohibiting Internet libel was introduced in 2009, although did not become law at that time.  See  
http://mountainx.com/news/community-
news/bloggers_gone_bad_criminal_penalty_for_libel_considered/. 
